

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-07 SAM-01 MC-02 SAJ-01 /083 W

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R 141500Z MAY 76

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3572

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USNATO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION USUN

AMCONSUL ADANA

AMCONGEN ISTANBUL

AMCONGEN IZMIR

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 3858

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY

SUBJECT: GOT THINKING ON CYPRUS TALKS

1. EMBOFF MAY 13 ASKED ECMEL BARUTCU, MFA CYPRUS-GREECE  
DIRECTOR, FOR A DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT GOT THINKING ON THE  
CYPRUS INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF SUBCOMMITTEES.  
IN A LENGTHY RESPONSE, BARUTCU EMPHASIZED THESE POINTS:

A. BASICALLY, WHAT THE GOT WANTS IS A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK  
THAT WILL ENABLE THE TWO MAINLAND COUNTRIES TO "CONTROL  
THE CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES" BY PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY. THAT OBJECTIVE  
WOULD BE REALIZED IF THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS --  
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PARTICULARLY ON TERRITORY -- COULD BE TURNED OVER TO SUB-

COMMITTEES ON WHICH GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD HAVE REPRESENTATIVES.

B. AT THE OSLO NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, TURKEY WILL MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS MUST BE CONTINUED BY SUBCOMMITTEES WITH MAINLAND PARTICIPATION.

C. THE REASONING BEHIND THIS POSITION IS:

(1) THE TWO CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES, NEGOTIATING DIRECTLY AT INTERVALS SINCE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BEGAN IN 1968, NEVER HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT AND THEY NEVER WILL. MAKARIOS, FOR REASONS OF HIS OWN, DOES NOT WANT AN AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS THAT ARE POSSIBLE; AND EVEN IF MAKARIOS WERE WILLING, DENKTASH WOULD HOLD BACK FROM AN AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF HIS SUSPICION THAT MAKARIOS WOULD BREAK IT SOON THEREAFTER.

(2) BY CONTRAST, THE TWO MAINLAND COUNTRIES WERE ABLE IN 1958-59 TO GET TOGETHER ON AN AGREEMENT AND TO COMPEL THE CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES TO ACCEPT IT. THE GREEK TEAM THAT CARRIED OUT THAT FEAT IS IN POWER IN ATHENS NOW.

D. THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT DEADLOCK IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS (SEE BELOW) IS TO IGNORE IT -- THAT IS, TO SET ASIDE BOTH SIDES' CONFLICTING DEMANDS FOR IMPLEMENTING THEIR INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT WAS AGREED ON AT THE FIFTH ROUND AT VIENNA, AND THEN HOLD ANOTHER ROUND AFTER WHICH THE TALKS COULD BE CONTINUED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEES.

E. HOWEVER, GREECE IS UNWILLING TO SUPPORT THE REFERRAL TO SUBCOMMITTEES AND SUBSEQUENT HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OF THE MAINLAND COUNTRIES. GREECE HAS CONTENTED BOTH THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEES WOULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATION DRAG ON TOO LONG ("WHAT COULD DRAG ON LONGER THAN THE TALKS AS THEY ARE?") AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON ALL ISSUES BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEES ARE SET UP -- WHICH WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, SINCE "AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE" WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON DETAILS.

F. THE GOT BELIEVES THAT ATHENS IS RESISTING THE SUBCOMMITTEE IDEA BECASUSE ACCEPTANCE OF IT WOULD INVOLVE CONFIDENTIAL

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KARAMANLIS IN A STRUGGLE WITH MAKARIOS WHICH IS NOT WORTH- WHILE FOR KARAMANLIS UNDER "PRESENT CONDITIONS," NAMELY:

(1) ANY SOLUTION THAT IS POSSIBLE NOW WILL BE UNFAVORABLE IN TERMS OF GREEK ASPIRATIONS, WHILE THE FUTURE MIGHT BRING A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER.

(2) GREECE NEEDS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE STATE OF

TENSION OVER CYPRUS IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE US ARMS EMBARGO  
AGAINST TURKEY.

(3) GREECE FEARS THAT IF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS  
SETTLED, TURKEY WILL BECOME AGGRESSIVE IN THE AEGEAN.

G. BY CONTRAST, TURKEY BELIEVES THE LONG-TERM  
INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES REQUIRE AN EARLY SOLUTION OF THE  
CYPRUS PROBLEM; AND ALTHOUGH TURKEY LIKE GREECE HAS  
INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES, IT IS NEVERTHELESS WILLING TO  
ENTER ACTIVE "BARGAINING".

2. BARUTCU ALSO SET FORTH THE GOT'S VIEWS ON THE CURRENT  
DEADLOCK IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, MAKING THESE POINTS:

A. THE BASIC POSITIONS IN THE DEADLOCK ARE THAT (A) THE  
TURKISH CYPRIOTS INSIST THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MUST REMOVE  
FROM THEIR TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS THE REFERENCE TO UNSYG  
WALDHEIM'S ALLEGED PROPOSALS, SO THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSALS  
ARE THEIR OWN, AFTER WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WILL GIVE THEIR  
OWN COUNTERPROPOSALS; WHILE (B) THE GREEK CYPRIOTS REFUSE AND  
MAINTAIN THAT UNTIL THEY HAVE RECEIVED THE TURKISH CYPRIOT  
COUNTERPROPOSALS, THERE IS NO REASON TO CONTINUE THE TALKS.

B. THE GREEK AND TURKISH FORMERS HAD AGREED AT  
BRUSSELS LAST DECEMBER THAT, WHEN THE TALKS WERE RESUMED,  
THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD SUBMIT THEIR TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS  
FIRST. CLERIDES, BEFORE GOING TO VIENNA FOR ROUND FIVE, HAD  
TOLD THE NICOSIA DAILY SIMERINI THAT HE WOULD MAKE PROPOSALS

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L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-07 SAM-01 MC-02 SAJ-01 /083 W  
----- 015443

R 141500Z MAY 76  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3573

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
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USCINCEUR  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 3858

ON TERRITORY, THAT IT HAD AGREED AT BRUSSELS THAT HE  
WOULD DO SO, AND THAT TURKEY WAS NOT BOUND TO MAKE PROPOSALS  
AT THAT STAGE.

C. WHAT HAPPENED AT VIENNA WAS THAT MAKARIOS  
INSTRUCTED CLERIDES TO AVOID COMPLYING WITH THE BRUSSELS  
ACCORD. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PROPOSALS WOULD BE PRESENTED  
LATER. THE COMMUNIQUE MENTIONED AN EXCHANGE OF PROPOSALS,  
BUT THE SECRET CLERIDES-DENKTASH AGREEMENT PROVIDED THAT  
CLERIDES WOULD SUBMIT HIS PROPOSALS FIRST. THIS SECRET  
AGREEMENT, WHICH MAKARIOS LATER DENOUNCED AND USED TO FIRE  
CLERIDES, WAS MERELY A REPETITION OF ONE PROVISION OF THE  
BRUSSELS ACCORD. WHILE GREEK PRIMIN CARAMANLIS  
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REPORTEDLY WAS FURIOUS OVER THE GREEK CYPRIOTS' NON-COMPLIANCE  
WITH THAT ACCORD, HE NEVER STOOD UP PUBLICLY AGAINST WHAT  
WAS DONE TO CLERIDES FOR ATTEMPTING TO SUPPORT THE PROCEDURE  
AGREED UPON BY THE GREEK FONMIN AT BRUSSELS.

D. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ALSO HAVE BEEN VIOLATING  
OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE BRUSSELS ACCORDS:

(1) THE STIPULATION AGAINST PRIOR CONDITIONS FOR  
HOLDING TALKS (THE GREEK CYPRIOTS INSISTED THAT THE RESUMED  
TALKS BE HELD IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNGA RESOLUTION ON  
CYPRUS, THAT TURKISH TROOPS BE REMOVED FROM THE ISLAND,  
AND NOW THAT THE TURKISH SIDE OFFER A TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL  
BEFORE TALKS CAN GO ON); AND

(2) THE PRINCIPLE, SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF THIRD PARTIES  
AT BRUSSELS, THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MENTION OF PERCENTAGE  
IN THE TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS (THE GREEK CYPRIOT PROPOSAL  
MENTIONED 20 PERCENT).

E. ANY SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE A PACKAGE SOLUTION, AS AGREED UPON AT BRUSSELS. AGREEMENT ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT. WHILE AS A PRACTICAL MATTER TERRITORY CAN BE DISCUSSED AS A SEPARATE ISSUE, THERE CAN BE NO CYPRUS SOLUTION WITHOUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS' ACCEPTANCE OF BIZONAL FEDERATION. THE GOT KNOWS THAT AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, THE GREEKS ACCEPTED BIZONAL FEDERATION. BUT NOW MAKARIOS IS TRYING TO BACK AWAY FROM IT.

3. EMBOFF ASKED BARUTCU HOW HE WOULD ANSWER THE POTENTIAL CHARGE THAT TURKEY WAS DEMANDING TOO MUCH IN INSISTING (BY IMPLICATION) THAT ATHENS SUBDUE MAKARIOS IN ORDER TO SET UP THE NEGOTIATING SUBCOMMITTEES, AND THEREFORE TURKEY WAS NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN A SOLUTION. BARUTCU RESPONDED THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WAS NOT ANEW ONE, AND THAT EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, THE ONLY WAY TO GET A SOLUTION WAS FOR THE MAINLAND COUNTRIES TO GET DIRECTLY INVOLVED. HE SAID THAT IDEALLY, MAKARIOS AND THE OTHER EXTREME GREEK CYPRIOT ELEMENTS WOULD BE SWEEPED AWAY BY THE DISCONTENTED IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY, AND THAT CLERIDES WOULD BE BROUGHT BACK WITH FULL POWERS. HOWEVER, HE SAID, IT WOULD BE BARELY POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY  
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WITH MAKARIOS STILL IN POWER, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE POWER BEFORE THE SOLUTION COULD BE PLACED IN EFFECT.

4. BARUTCU ALSO SAID THAT WHEN FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL MET WITH SENATORS EAGLETON AND KENNEDY IN WASHINGTON DURING HIS MARCH VISIT, IT WAS AGREED THAT THEY WOULD SEND HIM WRITTEN QUESTIONS ABOUT CYPRUS AND TURKISH POLICY. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE MFA HAD RECEIVED LETTERS FROM BOTH SENATORS WITH LENGTHY LISTS OF QUESTIONS, SOME OF WHICH WERE "QUITE TECHNICAL". THE MFA WILL POSTPONE REPLYING UNTIL AFTER THE OSLO NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, WHEN THEY HAVE SEEN WHETHER THE GREEK SIDE, BY ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD CONTINUING THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IN SUBCOMMITTEES, IS INTERESTED OR NOT IN A CYPRUS SOLUTION.  
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## Message Attributes

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